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Conservation is a fundamentally spatial pursuit. Human–elephant conﬂict (HEC), in particular crop-
raiding, is a signiﬁcant and complex conservation problem wherever elephants and people occupy the
same space. Conservationists and wildlife managers build electriﬁed fences as a technical solution to this
problem. Fences provide a spatial means of controlling human–elephant interactions by creating a place
for elephants and a place for cultivation. They are often planned and designed based on the ecology of the
target species. Yet as we show in this case study, behind their technical fac¸ade, fences are highly political.lephant
uman–elephant conﬂict
onservation
ences
oundaries
enya
This article presents the process of planning and building the 121km West Laikipia Fence: created to pre-
vent elephants from moving out of large private and government-owned ranches and onto smallholder
cultivated land to the west of Laikipia County. We seek to show how the construction of a fence to solve
the problem of HEC led to the division, reinforcement and communication of territory on the ground and
how this was captured and shaped by different, and sometimes conﬂicting, political interests.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).. Introduction
Conservation is fundamentally a spatial practice (Adams et al.,
014), based, as it is, on the conceptual separation of human
nd non-human, and the protection of one against the other. The
stablishment of protected areas has been the leading strategy of
onservation since theendof thenineteenth century (Adams, 2004;
heail, 2010). In colonial Africa, conservation policy constituted
new order for nature and human society, as the colonial state
ought to separate animals and people. Protected areas were the
ornerstone of that strategy, ﬁrstly in the form of game reserves,
nd latterly (especially after World War Two), in the form of
ational parks. An Anglo–American nature aesthetic drove a vision
f nature as wilderness, and the creation of protected areas as
slands of the wild in a peopled landscape (Neumann, 2004). Thus
he Selous Game Reserve was carved out of Liwale District in colo-
ial Tanzania in the1930s, abandoned to its elephants,whilepeople
ere moved out (Neumann, 2001). The story of displacement and
ispossession has become a standard of critical political ecology
Brockington, 2002; Brockington et al., 2008; Kelly, 2015), with
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: laurenamyevans@gmail.com (L.A. Evans), wa12@cam.ac.uk
W.M. Adams).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.11.008
264-8377/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article unAfrica as one of its prime exemplars (Neumann, 2002; Garland,
2008).
The conceptual and practical placing of nature within speciﬁc
spatial bounds can be thought of in terms of the creation of con-
servation territories (Peters, 1994; Hughes, 2005). Elden (2010:
810) described territory as an object of governance: ‘a rendering
of the emergent concept of ‘space’ as a political category: owned,
distributed, mapped, calculated, bordered and controlled’. The cre-
ation of territorialisation is a process reﬂecting the exercise of
power, and the control of space, people and nature. Kelly (2015)
identiﬁed protected areas as ‘internal territories’, areas set aside
within national boundaries where nature and the use of nature by
people, are controlled.
Sack (1986: 32) noted that territory is easy to demarcate since
in principle it requires only one kind of a marker or sign: the
boundary. Territorialisation can be deﬁned as the process by which
institutions attempt to control actions by drawing boundaries
around a geographic space, excluding some categories of indi-
viduals from this space, and prescribing speciﬁc activities within
these boundaries (Vandergeest, 1996). The key element in con-
servation territorialisation is the demarcation and enforcement of
boundaries, and these boundaries are the spatial focus of legal and
coercive action in support of conservationoutcomes (Peluso, 1993).
There is a rich scholarly literature on the politics of boundary
making. Jones (1945) described four stages of boundary making:
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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he allocation of territory; delimitation (choosing the alignment);
emarcation (the physical marking on the ground); and adminis-
ration (perpetuation of the physical boundary). Within political
eography, boundaries have typically been analysed at the scale
f the state, as the most explicit manifestation of the large-scale
onnections between politics and geography (Newman and Paasi,
998). However, the creation of boundaries at ﬁner scales also gen-
rates signiﬁcantpolitical processes.Newman (2006: 148) suggests
hat the alignment of borders is ‘normally determined by politi-
al and social élites as part of the process of societal ordering and
ompartmentalisation’. Although a boundary may appear to be a
learly deﬁned line, it is often an outcome of a complex, contested
egotiation between different actors (Häkli, 2008). The process of
hysically demarcating aboundary is the ‘cruxof all boundarymak-
ng’ (Holdich, 1916: 208): ‘it is in this process that disputes usually
rise, and weak elements in the [plan] are apt to be discovered’.
Barriers are the physical realisation of boundaries and take
any forms: most conspicuously fences and walls (Spierenburg
nd Wels, 2006). However they universally function as both phys-
cal markers and as symbolic icons that convey particular political
eanings in the social landscapes inwhich they exist (Peters, 1994;
uzuki, 2001). They help to institutionalise the collective recogni-
ion of property rights and ﬁx control over land use (Kotchemidova,
008). They are a spatial projection of power that transforms
ot only the relations between nature and society but also social
elations within a landscape (Van Sittert, 2002) in which ‘people
egotiate the meanings of land, resources and property’ (Sheridan,
008: 154). Boundaries and associated barriers reﬂect the nature
f power relations between actors and the ability of one party to
etermine and impose categories of inclusion and exclusion of oth-
rs (Ganster and Lorey, 2005; Newman, 2006). Geopolitically, walls
ave been signatures of territorial reconﬁgurations (Waterman,
994; Thomas 1999; Daniel, 2000; Griggs, 2000; Brawer, 2002)
nd are increasingly being built along national boundaries to deﬁne
igration policies (Loyd et al., 2013). Furthermore, fence materials
hemselves have shaped sociopolitical landscapes. The invention
f barbed wire in 1873, for example, transformed the American
est, as settlers demarcated their patch of land in the frontier
Peffer, 1951). As Krell (2002: 160) notes, ‘barbed wire has always
unctioned in that paradoxical zone, between protection and divi-
ion’. Barbed wire represents symbolic as well as physical power:
s Razac (2002) notes, barbed wire embodies heavy memories of
he trenches ofWorldWar I; and the concentration camps ofWorld
ar II.
In conservation, fenced boundaries deﬁne conservation territo-
ies, strengthening the fortress approach by physically actualising
he nature-society divide (Brockington, 2002). Fences for conserva-
ion purposes tend to be planned and built to separate nature from
hreatening human activity (Hayward and Kerley, 2009), invasive
pecies (e.g. Brooket al., 2004), disease (e.g. Sutmoller, 2002)orper-
ecution resulting from conﬂict or the illegal killing of wildlife (e.g.
acker et al., 2013). Protected area boundaries are often fenced to
xclude local people (redeﬁning human movement onto protected
and as trespassing, the collection of fuel wood, cattle fodder or
ood as theft; hunting for meat as poaching; and making a home
s encroachment, Homewood and Rodgers, 1991; Spierenburg and
els, 2006; Brockington et al., 2006; Duffy, 2000; Büscher, 2010).
t the same time, such fences typically permit entry for certain
ategories of people (e.g. tourists).
Conservation fences may be planned for technical reasons, but
heir construction is highly political. Wels (2000) describes how
he white shareholders of Save Valley Conservancy in Zimbabwe
ished to generate revenue to invest into its neighbouring com-
unities through a hunting tourism operation. To do so, it was
legal requirement to build a veterinary fence to keep buffalo
ff neighboring farmland. To white conservancy shareholders thee Policy 51 (2016) 215–228
fence represented a necessary means to generate beneﬁts that
could ﬂow over their boundary. However for surrounding small-
holder farmers the fence represented an ‘insurmountable physical
and symbolic obstacle, because it puts the disputed signature of
the white owner and its social identity on the land’ (Wels, 2000:
xxi). In the Karoo region of South Africa, the enclosure of the open
semi-arid landscape with fences from the late 19th Century – to
deﬁne private ranches and later, conservation areas, and exclude
trespassers – constrained the mobility and resilience of people and
wildlife (Sheridan, 2008; Roche, 1908; Rohde and Hoffman, 2008;
Benjaminsenet al., 2008). Today, thesehardened fencedboundaries
persist, supported by the narratives of powerful conservationist
actors about land degradation, and contribute to the insecurity of
rights and livelihoods of the poor (Benjaminsen et al., 2008).
In the context of fenced conservation boundaries, patterns of
exclusion and inclusion also extend to animals, both domestic
and wild. The expansion of human settlement and cultivation
onto elephant range could be understood as an act of forced
colonisation. Donaldson andKymlicka (2011) describe such human
encroachment as an act of appropriation and an assault on the
sovereignty of wild animals. Elephants can certainly be under-
stoodaspolitical actors, exercising agency in thepolitical ecologyof
human–elephant conﬂict (Evans and Adams, in preparation). Thus
when theboundaries of EtoshaNational Park, Namibia,were drawn
and enforced, dogs that had been used for herding by Herero pas-
toralists for centuries were no longer allowed: dogs that crossed
into the Park were shot as a threat to wildlife (Hoole and Berkes,
2010). Likewise, conservationboundariesdeterminewhatwild ani-
mals can do. Wild animals may roam at will within protected
areas, designated as ‘wildlife’, to be protected, photographed or
researched. Yet once those same animals cross a protected area
boundary and intrude on landscapes designated for people, they
are re-classiﬁed as marauding, dangerous pests (Wels, 2000).
Where people andwildlife coexist, a common result is described
as ‘human–wildlife conﬂict’. This widely used term refers to nega-
tive interactions between people and wild animals, conﬂating the
impacts of wildlife on people and their activities, and associated
conﬂicts between conservationists and other people about these
impacts (Redpath et al., 2015). Human–wildlife conﬂict is a prob-
lem throughout Africa, not only around protected areas fromwhich
animals issue forth and raid farmer’s crops, but also where wild
animals and people share unprotected land. Many animals raid
crops (primates, bush-pigs and rodents, for example), but the most
intractable crop-raiding problems in Africa are associated with
the African elephant, Loxodonta africana. Human-elephant conﬂict
(HEC) is recognised to be a serious problem across African elephant
range, particularly along the hard boundaries that separate culti-
vation from wildlife areas (Graham et al., 2009; Hoare, 2012). HEC
encompasses the range of negative interactions that occur between
people and elephants sharing a landscape and includes signiﬁcant
damage to crops, property, livestock risk to human life andthe
retaliatory killings of elephants (Barua, 2010; Graham et al., 2012).
Elephants have a vast requirement for space and resources (Blake
et al., 2003; Leggett, 2006), and although elephant numbers have
declined since the latest poaching crisis began in 2011 (Nellemann
et al., 2013; White, 2014), human settlement and the expansion
of smallholder cultivation on rangeland used by elephants have
created conditions for conﬂict in many countries.
HEC is among the most emotive and political form of human-
wildlife conﬂict (Lee andGraham, 2006). Elephants embodydiverse
cultural contradictions: they are a serious and sometimes danger-
ous croppest and are locally feared.HEC can elicit violent responses
from people. Mariki et al. (2015), for example, described the killing
of six elephants in northern Tanzania as a result not only of a desire
for retribution for crop or property damage but also of a wider,
underlying resistance to the appropriation of land for conservation
nd Use Policy 51 (2016) 215–228 217
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hat had marginalised and disempowered local people. At the same
ime, internationally, elephants have an iconic status, are widely
evered or even loved, and in conservation terms are regarded as
hreatened, and are protected (Lorimer, 2010; Barua, 2013).
The importance attached to elephants, and their destructive
ower, puts a political premiumon reducingHEC in elephant range
ountries Africa. Experiments have been made with ‘community-
ased’, reactive HEC-mitigation measures such as chili fences,
atchtowers, lights, noise-generation and bees. All have proved
o be ineffective at deterring elephants at a large scale due to
he labour and technical skills required (Sitati and Walpole, 2006;
raham and Ochieng, 2008; Hoare, 2012). The attempt of gov-
rnment wildlife managers, to address conﬂict is hampered by
imited resources, and the fact that crop-raiding is intermittent,
ifﬁcult to predict and widespread in space (Graham et al., 2010).
elayed response to raids and the problem of ﬁnding the animals
oncerned (leading to the wrong animals being targeted), makes
fﬁcial responses often both unsatisfactory and ineffective (Hoare,
012).
The failure of deterrence methods in reducing crop-raiding has
ed to increasing investment in electriﬁed fences to manage the
roblematic relationship between farmers and elephants. In Kenya,
or example, the Kenya Wildlife Service estimates that a total of
245km of electriﬁed fencing currently stands in Kenya with an
dditional 1000km under the process of construction (KWS, 2014).
lectriﬁed fencesareanattempt to createhardboundaries that con-
rol human-elephant interactions anddesignate separate spaces for
lephants and for farmers.
Despite their stated technical and ecological purpose, elephant
ences are inherently political. HEC reﬂects and generates complex
olitical interactions—between conservation agencies and farmers
nd between different land users, over rights to use land and the
ight to protection from crop-raiding. Fences, offered as a techni-
al solution to this problem, serve to hide the politics of elephant
rop-raiding and of access to land. The depoliticisation of policy
nterventions through the deployment of technical narratives has
long history in development. Ferguson describes how, with the
ick of a switch, the anti-politics machine depoliticises ‘everything
t touches, everywhere whisking political realities out of sight, all
he while performing, almost unnoticed, its own pre-eminently
olitical operation’ (Ferguson, 1990: xv). In her analysis of a conser-
ation and development intervention in Indonesia, Li (2007: 126)
escribes how boundaries were inscribed and social-political pro-
esses rationalised in technical terms; in this process of ‘rendering
echnical’, project implementers ‘highlighted only those problems
or which a technical solution could be proposed’. Anti-politics is
nherent to science-based policy interventions, aspiring to provide
echnical solutions to problems that are fundamentally political.
üscher (2010: 48) contends that anti-politics is a necessary polit-
cal strategy for those implementing the conservation intervention
o ‘make things happen’.
In this paper, we analyse the politics behind the anti-political
rocess of conservation boundary-making through the construc-
ion of elephant fences. We focus on the process of planning
nd constructing a 121km electriﬁed fence in Laikipia County,
orth-central Kenya, along the border of large cattle ranches to
top crop-raiding by elephants on neighbouring smallholder land.
he stated intention of the West Laikipia Fence was to separate
lephants from cultivation. We explore the politics behind its con-
truction, especially theway inwhich its construction furthered the
nderlying political interests of different stakeholders. We seek to
how that the fence that was built was the outcome of complex
olitical negotiation and conﬂict between stakeholders. In particu-
ar, we consider the way the fence served to deﬁne, communicate
nd reinforce territory in a way that helped secure the land tenure
f powerful actors.Fig. 1. Location of Laikipia County within Kenya.
2. Study area
Laikipia comprises a 9800km2 plateau and one county located
on the equator betweenMountKenya, theAberdareMountains and
the Rift Valley in north-central Kenya (Fig. 1). Rainfall is typically
bimodal seasonally, but is unpredictable and may fall at any time
of year. However rainfall declines from 800mm per annum in the
south to just 300mm in the north (Berger, 1989). Laikipia has no
formally protected wildlife areas, but contains the second highest
abundance ofwildlife in Kenya, afterMaasaiMaraNational Reserve
(Kinnaird and O’Brien, 2012).
Ownership of and access to land in Laikipia has been punctuated
by waves of exclusion and inclusion. The ﬁrst of these involved the
two Anglo-Maasai Treaties in 1904 and 1911. Under the ﬁrst, the
colonial government moved Maasai people into Laikipia from the
Central Rift Valley to form the Maasai Northern Reserve. Under the
second, in 1911, they evicted them to allow European Settlement,
causing the death of many people and cattle (Hughes, 2006; 2007).
The British government wanted to create an export-orientated free
market economy in theBritish EastAfricanProtectorate (Pestalozzi,
1986) and in pursuit of this set the highlands of Kenya (dubbed
‘The White Highlands’) aside for European settlement. The eviction
of pastoralists from Laikipia in 1911 reﬂected the colonial govern-
ment’s view of pastoralism as irrational, uneconomic and based on
accumulation for its own sake (Kenya Land Commission, 1933).
Once cleared, Laikipia was swiftly subdivided into large land
units for European settlers. Large ranches over 10,000 acres were
thought to be needed for proﬁtable cattle production (Vaughan,
2005). Europeansettlementhaddramatic social impactsonLaikipia
(Wambuguh, 2007). It createda small, powerful, Europeanelite that
was responsible for the management of almost all land in Laikipia.
After Kenyan independence in 1963, some settler families
retained their properties, but many Europeans sold up and left
the country. Some former settler land in Laikipia was bought, both
under government schemes and by private land buying syndicates,
and subdivided into 1.2–5 acre plots for settlement, mostly by
Kikuyu smallholders from Central Kenya (Kohler, 1987; Thouless,
1994). Initially, such settlement was planned in the light of land
218 L.A. Evans, W.M. Adams / Land Use Policy 51 (2016) 215–228
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uitability, but over time the political aim of settling as many land-
ess people as possible and the demand for land for economic
ecurity and to proﬁt from land sales, became dominant drivers
f land exchange (Huber and Oponde, 1995). As a result, proper-
ies in more arid areas were purchased and subdivided (Graham,
007), and the size and cultivation potential of plots distributed
mong shareholders declined over time. Many plots were aban-
oned or never settled at all (Kohler, 1987) because they were too
ry for rain fed agriculture and lacked a water source for irrigation,
r because of legal disputes with land buying companies.
Under the Land (GroupRepresentatives) Act of 1968, theKenyan
overnment also established group ranches in order to encourage
astoralists to settle, commercialise, conserve rangeland and invest
n infrastructure (Grandin, 1987). Many group ranches in Kenya
ailed in these objectives due to their insufﬁcient size and pasture,
lite capture and governance issues (Herren, 1991) Eleven group
anches were established in Laikipia.
Laikipia today therefore comprises a mosaic of different land
ses and tenure shaped by colonial and post-colonial land policies.
arge commercial cattle ranches cover 39% of the County, small-
older plots cover 34%, government owned land 8.5% (one ranch,
eterinary outspans, land bought by the government settlement
rust fund and swamps), group ranches 7%, forest reserves 7%, and
rban areas 4.5% (LWF, 2012). The result is a spatially chaotic jux-
aposition of various kinds of large land units with populations of
ildlife, and scattered smallholder farms. This has made Laikipia
articularly vulnerable to crop-raiding by elephants.
Stakeholders in the Laikipia landscape have very different inter-
sts in relation to land and elephants, and different powers to
ursue them. Responsibility to protect wildlife, and to protect citi-
ens and private property against wildlife, lies with the parastatal
enya Wildlife Service. Various conservation NGOs seek to secure
he place of elephants in the Laikipia landscape. The owners of
arge-scale ranches mostly tolerate elephants, and indeed many
ave developed wildlife tourism enterprises as they diversiﬁedn Laikipia in 2007.
their business models (Thouless, 1994; LWF, 2012). Smallholder
farmers fear crop-raiding and want elephants to be excluded from
their land and their crops, or removed altogether. Pastoralists tend
to have a more tolerant relationship with elephants (Gadd, 2005;
Graham 2007), and have long sought access to grass for their live-
stock across Laikipia’s mosaic of land tenure.
The use of land in Laikipia by elephants has changed over time.
Colonial and post-colonial records suggest that elephants were
rare in Laikipia at the end of the nineteenth century, presumably
as a result of over-hunting for ivory by coastal trading caravans
(Neumann, 1898). Records start to increase in the 1970s, probably
because of the rise of intense poaching to the north in Samburu in
the 1970s and 1980s, which is believed to have driven elephants
into Laikipia (Thouless, 1992). By the 1990s, elephants were com-
mon on ranchland in Laikipia.
Although Laikipia contains no formally protected areas, ranch
land provides over 3600km2 of undeveloped habitat where human
population densities are very low (1/km2). The dense vegetation
and provision of water from livestock dams within ranches pro-
vides good habitat for an estimated 6400 elephants (Ngene et al.,
2013). Ranches alsoprovide adaytime refuge fromwhichelephants
can move at night to raid smallholder crops (Graham et al., 2009).
Elephants are the largest, widest ranging and most destructive
species in Laikipia. Crop-raiding had become a politically promi-
nent wildlife issue by the early 80s, arousing hostility to both
elephants and those managing them (Jenkins and Hamilton, 1982).
By the early decades of the twentieth century, Laikipia had amongst
the highest numbers of HEC incidents in East Africa (Graham et al.,
2010).
As crop-raiding by elephants increased on smallholder farms,
intolerance of elephants grew among smallholder farmers. Ele-
phants were increasingly seen by smallholders to ‘belong’ to
ranches since they beneﬁtted from the presence of elephants
through tourism (Thouless, 1994), and ranchers faced mounting
political pressure to keep elephants off their smallholder neigh-
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ours’ land. Both smallholders and the politicians who represented
hem began to view electriﬁed fencing as an obligation of large-
cale ranchers. In 1982, theWildlife andConservationManagement
epartment proposed a single fence across Laikipia to prevent ele-
hants from moving from ‘wildlife-tolerant’ large-scale ranches
n the low rainfall area to the east and north, onto the wetter
rea of smallholder cultivation in the south and west (Jenkins
nd Hamilton, 1982). However, without funding to support con-
truction costs, and in the absence of consensus from all ranchers,
his fence was not built. Instead, electriﬁed fences were only built
y better-endowed ranches to stop elephants raiding (Thouless
nd Sakwa, 1995). Other ranchers did not fence their properties,
ecause of a low presence of elephants (or an active policy of
eterring them), because of cost or because they believed that the
aikipia landscape should be contiguous wildlife habitat, not sub-
ivided by fences.
In 2002, the idea of a Laikipia-wide fence was resurrected.
houless et al. (2002) developed a fencing strategy for Laikipia
nder the Laikipia Wildlife Forum that followed Jenkins and
amilton (1982) proposed line. However, to avoid problems of
wnership and maintenance of a single fence, the strategy advo-
ated a ‘modular approach, which would support the construction
f individual fences that ﬁtted within an overall framework’
Thouless et al., 2002: 3). By 2007, contiguous sections of electri-
ed fencehadbeen constructed along theperimeter of tendifferent
roperties on Laikipia (Fig. 2), but there was a large gap to the west.
he fence that was constructed to close this gap – the West Laikipia
ence – is the focus of this paper.
. Methods
This paper draws on ﬁeldwork that was carried out between
anuary and December 2012. As part of a wider social-ecological
tudy, the ﬁrst author conducted in-depth interviews with a range
f stakeholders of the West Laikipia Fence project. Grimble and
ellard (1997) deﬁne stakeholders as any person or group, orga-
isedorunorganised,with an interest or stake in an issueor system.
e identiﬁed the stakeholders as those organisations and individ-
als involved in planning and construction of the West Laikipia
ence, as follows: (1) local political leaders at the county level
nd in the seven sub-locations through which the West Laikipia
ence passed (the administrative structure of the Government of
enya divides counties into locations and sub-locations, which
re headed by a location chief and a sub-location chief elected by
ounty government ofﬁcials); (2) conservation organisationswork-
ng in Laikipia: the Laikipia Wildlife Forum and Kenya Wildlife
ervice; (3) owners ormanagers of ranches (hereafter called ‘ranch-
rs’) that bordered the West Laikipia Fence and ranchers elsewhere
n Laikipia who had experience of electriﬁed elephant fences; (4)
mallholder farmers who lived and/or farmed within 3km of the
ence (this distancewas selected on the basis of a GIS analysis of the
istance between GPS locations of ﬁve collared elephants through-
ut2010and2011, thatdetermined themeandistancemovedbyan
lephant crop-raiding was 2.6 km into smallholder land from the
ence Evans, 2014); (5) pastoralists who lived and grazed within
km of the fence.
In the case of political leaders, conservationists and ranch man-
gers (stakeholder groups 1–3), all individuals or representatives
f relevant organisations were interviewed. In some cases more
han one individual was interviewed in an organisation if the ﬁrst
nterviewee suggested that theywould have further insights. In the
ase of smallholder farmers and pastoralists (stakeholder groups 4
nd 5), snowball sampling was used to choose interviewees. The
rst individuals interviewed were purposively selected from exist-
ng knowledge of the fence and the area (Evans, 2014), and askedPolicy 51 (2016) 215–228 219
to suggest other people who had been involved in consultations
regarding the planning and building of the West Laikipia Fence.
We started the interviews by informing the participants about
the research. Interviews were informal and conversational in style
and loosely guided by a list of topics for discussion, speciﬁc for each
stakeholder group. In total, we conducted in-depth interviewswith
63 individuals. Interviews were carried out in either English by the
ﬁrst author or inKiswahili orMaaand translatedverbally to theﬁrst
author. We used a combination of recording and note-taking. We
also held seven focus group discussions in each sub-location along
the West Laikipia Fence to understand the history of community
engagementwith the fence. Additionally,we carried out interviews
with key informants who were chosen based on their knowledge
andability to contribute insightful informationon theuseof fencing
todeter elephants. Finally,we reviewed relevant grey literature and
other studies. We transcribed interviews soon after they ﬁnished.
We coded transcripts with an initial descriptive coding system of
surface-level messages, and then a pattern coding system to reveal
patterns and perceptions (Hoggart et al., 2002). Respondents were
kept anonymous, and are identiﬁed in this paper by a number.
4. Conception
4.1. An apolitical fence
In early 2006, the Laikipia Wildlife Forum (hereafter ‘the LWF’)
developed a proposal for an electriﬁed fence to be built along ranch
boundaries in western Laikipia. The LWF had been established in
1992 under the leadership of a ranch owner who was a direct
descendent of a former white landowner. He saw the forum as an
institution ‘tobuildbridgesbetween ranchers and theirneighbours’
(Interview no. 28, February 2012). From its inception, the LWF was
a membership organisation, in which any individual or institution
could join for a varying fee. The LWF’s membership was diverse
and included ranchers, smallholder farmers, pastoralists, group
ranches, natural resource user groups, schools, conservation and
development NGOs. The LWF had ambitious conservation goals, in
that it sought to represent the interests of its entire membership,
although as we discuss, these interests were often in conﬂict.
A win–win narrative dominated the LWF’s proposal. On one
hand, the fence would ‘safeguard the livelihoods of small-scale
farmers in thewest. . . through increased food security and reduced
livestock theft’ (LWF, 2006: 8). On the other hand, it would pro-
tect biodiversity – particularly elephants – by reducing the number
of ‘elephants killed due to human-wildlife conﬂict’. Furthermore,
it would ‘support biodiversity related livelihoods’ – speciﬁcally
tourism – as well as improving attitudes towards wildlife and con-
solidating conservation efforts in Laikipia (LWF, 2006: 8). Beyond
the direct impacts, the proposal also claimed that the fence would
reduce ‘unsustainable resource use practices’ because, human-
wildlife conﬂict is known to force ‘people to poison elephants
and into activities such as charcoal production and bush meat
trade...and poaching’ (LWF, 2006: 2).
McShane et al. (2011) describe how win-win language about
the simultaneous achievement of positive conservation and devel-
opment has come to dominate the external and internal discourse
in conservationorganisations. Community-based conservationwas
born out of this win–win approach, on the basis that local peo-
ple are more likely to support conservation if they have stake in
its management, that excluding them from the decision making
process is an infringement of their human rights, that they have
traditional governance systems for natural resources and that the
costs of conservation are directly offset (Adams and Hulme, 2001;
Baker, 2004; Brockington et al., 2006). Despite their frequent fail-
ure to achieve conservation and development objectives (Barrett
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nd Arcese, 1995; Songorwa et al., 2000; Wells and McShane,
004) win–win narratives of conservation continue to dominate
he sector. McShane et al. (2011) note that such approaches have
he appearance of being ethical, efﬁcient, and highly marketable
nd are therefore appealing to donors. Furthermore the win–win
aradigm avoids the ‘potentially divisive political requirements of
nderstanding and confronting explicit trade-offs between com-
eting stakeholders’ (Wells and McShane, 2004; McShane et al.,
011: 969; Salafsky, 2011).
The LWF funding proposal framed the West Laikipia Fence as
technical issue, lying completely outside the realm of politics.
he complexity of the social landscape and politics that under-
inned access to land was reduced to a simple and ostensibly
technical’ solution: an exercise in anti-politics (Ferguson, 1990;
üscher, 2010). Apolitical rhetoric, like win–win language, had a
owerful function in Laikipia: to ensure and justify support and
esources from donors. The LWF and the MP were highly effec-
ive at raising funds. Within a year they raised nearly 65 million
enyan Shillings (US$ 970,000) from the Dutch Government, the
overnment of Kenya (through the Kenyan Wildlife Service, and
onstituency Development Fund), and from the International Fund
or Animal Welfare. The proposal, as well as appealing to donors,
lso served to fulﬁll their organisational aimof appealing tomuchof
heir membership. HEC represented a ‘signiﬁcant diplomatic chal-
enge’ for the LWF (Interview no. 21, September 2012) in that a
arge component of theirmembershipwere angry and frustratedby
lephants destroying their crops, while another component were
rying to conserve elephants, and another component owned most
f the elephant habitat within ranches.
.2. Political fence
Even though the funding proposal for the West Laikipia Fence
ought to be apolitical, the issue of HEC and of fencing as a solution
o it was already highly charged politically. In the run up to the
007 Kenyan elections, HEC had become a prominent and politi-
ised campaigning topic in Laikipia. Mounting intolerance towards
lephants amongst smallholders led aspiring politicians to rally the
upport of their smallholder constituents with promises of solv-
ng the problems they faced in sharing a landscape with elephants.
he reduction of crop-raiding was an integral component of the
ampaign run by the incumbent Member of Parliament (MP) for
aikipia West Constituency who was seeking to hold his seat in the
pcomingelection at the endof 2007. TheMPhadbeenaprominent
eader behind the ‘Africanisation’ of Kenya after independence. He
elped to establish many of the land-buying companies for Kikuyu
mallholder fromcentral Kenya inwestern Laikipia andhadhimself
ought a 22,000-acre ranch in western Laikipia.
The MP was also a major proponent of wildlife governance
eform in Kenya. He developed and lobbied for a Wildlife Bill in
004 that attempted to decentralise Kenya’s wildlife governance,
hich the President did not pass (Kabiri, 2010). The MP’s political
nterest in wildlife in his constituency meant that he was closely
nvolvedwith theworkof the LWF. TheMPhadworked closelywith
he Director of the LWF (who served from 2009 to 2012) in devel-
ping, attempting to lobby his wildlife bill through parliament in
004.
The opportunity to close the gap in the Laikipia-wide fence to
nally solveHECwas an attractive prospect for theMP’s re-election
ampaign in2007. Leading the fencingofwestern Laikipia’s ranches
ppealed strongly to his smallholder farmer constituency, who
ere suffering from persistent crop-raiding by elephants leavinghe ranches. It also helped secure the position of their large ranch
eighbours, of which he was one, by promising to remove the nui-
ance of crop raids. Sitting on a ranch house veranda in September
005, the MP asked the ranchers and the LWF whether they coulde Policy 51 (2016) 215–228
help him to complete the trans-Laikipia fence. The LWF Director
saw the MP’s political backing as an opportunity to secure funding
for a large-scale conservation project: one that provided a simple,
technical, solution to the complex problem of HEC in Laikipia. Fur-
thermore, it was a high-proﬁle and politically supported solution.
Additionally, for the LWF Director, the fence also represented his
own beliefs about the relationship between people and wildlife:
‘The reasonwhymost Kenyans are ambivalent or loathewildlife
is because the relationship they have with wildlife is a direct
one. If you don’t desire a direct relationship with wildlife and if
you can stophaving a direct relationshipwithwildlife, your atti-
tude towardswildlifewill change.’ (Interviewno. 22, September
2012)
The MP wanted the fence built quickly. In February 2006, he
and the LWF set up a committee to provide technical advice on
the building of the fence, comprised of the MP, the LWF, the
Kenya Wildlife Service, local politicians and ranch owners. He also
engaged the media. An article published in the Daily Nation news-
paper laid out his political past and future intentions, entitled ‘[MP]
proposes 50 million KES fence to keep out elephants’ (Daily Nation,
2006). In it, the MP was quoted as saying, ‘destruction of crops and
loss of lives bywild animalswouldhavebeen curbedby theWildlife
Billwhich thePresidentdeclined toassent to.Wehavenochoicebut
to erect a fence’ (Daily Nation, 2006: 6). The LWF Director recalled
the ‘persistent pressure’ placed on him by the MP in the form of
weekly phone calls to speed up the process of funding and building
the West Laikipia Fence:
‘Coming from an elder of the political establishment of Kenya,
you pay attention.’ (Interview no. 22, September 2012).
Even before the West Laikipia Fence was built, it served the
purposes of two signiﬁcant stakeholders: by promising to reduce
HEC, it forwarded a political campaign and it helped a conservation
organisation to achieve its goals.
5. Planning the fence
5.1. Consultation
The LWF’s proposal simpliﬁed the social complexity of Laikipia.
It focused the West Laikipia Fence on a target group: the ‘stake-
holders and beneﬁciaries’ were the smallholder farmers living ‘in
close proximity’ to the fence (LWF, 2006: 8). Ferguson (1990: 83)
described how, in the concept of a development intervention in
Lesotho, ‘the centrality of agriculture in the local economy was the
unquestionedpremiseof theentireproject’, althoughmigrantwage
labour was the most important source of income for most house-
holds. Similarly, the local economy promoted by the West Laikipia
Fence proposal was framed wholly around cultivation, since small-
holders were the stakeholders whose livelihoods were suffering
from frequent elephant crop-raiding, even though livestock keep-
ing was important for many people on Laikipia.
Kikuyu smallholder farmers are politically signiﬁcant actors
within Laikipia. Most own their land and depend on it for their
livelihoods; they are vulnerable to attack by elephants. Through
his campaign for the fence, the MP was contributing to securing
their tenureof land, their livelihoods, andalso their votes.However,
smallholder farmers were not the only people living outside the
ranches on Laikipia. Different pastoralist groups have used Laikipia
for centuries (Lane, 2010; Watson, 2014), and were widely dis-
tributed across the area. Research carried out in the mid-2000s
hadﬂagged the increasing importanceof Laikipia’sunoccupied sub-
divided smallholder land to pastoralists (Lane, 2005; Gadd, 2005;
Graham, 2007). Yet the LWF proposal only referred to pastoralists
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ndirectly, in terms of their signiﬁcance to elephants. They were
ramed as broadly tolerant of wildlife: stable wildlife numbers in
he dry north and east of Laikipia were attributed to ‘attitudes
owards wildlife amongst pastoralist communities’ (LWF, 2006:
). Pastoralists’ use of land was not considered central to the pro-
osed fence. Although the LWF’s fencing strategy had warned that
astoralists have undermined other electriﬁed fences in Laikipia
Thouless et al., 2002), the proposal stated that ‘the fence structure
tself... will not impinge on the movements of people or livestock’
LWF, 2006: 6). Moreover it claimed that the fence would have an
dditional positive social impact on smallholders’ security by ‘con-
rolling livestock movements through agreed access ways and so
ivestock theft will be reduced’ (LWF, 2006: 6).
By presenting a simpliﬁed account of land use in Laikipia,
entred on smallholder cultivation, the narrative to donors was
lear, and a distinct smallholder territory was deﬁned. A fence
ould create an elephant territory in eastern Laikipia, and ensure
hat elephants no longer strayed onto newly demarcated small-
older territory in western Laikipia. This narrative strengthened
nd simpliﬁed the LWF’s conservation narrative on their objective
f ﬁnding a permanent solution to HEC.
In July 2006 the LWF began an ‘extensive process of stakeholder
onsultation’ to ‘ensure that the fence had buy-in and support from
he stakeholders living by it’ and to ‘discuss the implications of the
ence and what the costs were in terms of maintenance and lost
pportunities’ (Interview no. 25, October 2012). The LWF held a
eries of public meetings within each of the seven sub-locations
hrough which the proposed fence would pass through, to which
he chief of each sub-location invited hundreds of smallholders and
esident pastoralists. Pastoralists were reported to have raised no
oncerns about the fence:
‘They wanted in, they were in agreement’ (Interview no. 25,
October 2012).
In each sub-location chiefs and community leaders were almost
holly smallholders. Inevitably smallholder voices and concerns
ominated the meetings. The LWF established four ‘fence commit-
ees’ at the meetings by voting for membership through a show
f hands. The committees were comprised entirely of smallholders
iving next to the proposed fence. Each committee signed letters
eclaring their unanimous and ongoing support of the fence.
Despite this seemingly unanimous support, the LWF Director
ccepted in retrospect that the impacts of the fence on pastoralists
ere not properly addressed at this stage:
‘Therewas awhole section of societywe did not pick up on. That
was the people who this fence was extremely inconvenient to
and undesirable for, because it prevented them from accessing
grazing. For some reason that was not apparent at the onset.’
(Interview no. 22, September 2012)
The reason pastoralists did not object to the fence in the consul-
ation meetings was primarily because the activity that the fence
ould inhibit – grazing on privately owned ranch and smallholder
was illegal:
‘Of course they didn’t want to speak out about it in public.’
(Interview no. 25, October 2012)
Pastoralists have formal communal tenure in just seven per cent
f Laikipia County, within 11 group ranches (LWF, 2012): none
f this land in the central or well-watered southern parts of the
lateau. Pastoral groups regularly grazed stock on land further
outh legally held but not occupied by smallholders. Unlike small-
olders and ranch owners, most pastoralists did not have rights to
and on Laikipia, despite the historical importance of the plateau
or seasonal grazing. Since colonial times, pastoralist access to thePolicy 51 (2016) 215–228 221
land in Laikipia had beenmarked by exclusion, and their use of land
almost everywhere was uncertain and extra-legal.
By 2000, de-facto informal use of land by pastoralists was
widespread. Pastoralists habitually obtained illegal access to pas-
ture within large-scale ranches, either using unguarded land, or
by arriving and negotiating access when challenged. The LWF
(2012) estimated that of Laikipia’s 9800km2, pastoralists utilised
3500km2 informally or illegally and were granted access to a fur-
ther 2000km2 on certain ranches under managed grazing regimes.
Ranch owners vehemently resisted illegal grazing on their ranches.
To them, an ‘elephant fence’ provided a valuable tool against ille-
gal grazing. Land abandoned or unoccupied by smallholders left
a vacuum in a mosaic of otherwise privately owned land, which
allowed pastoralists from outside Laikipia (Samburu, Baringo and
Turkana) to graze cattle and take up residence. After 2007 there
was an inﬂux of Samburu pastoralists settling south andwest of the
Laikipia Fence, due to inter-ethnic conﬂict with Pokot pastoralists
over access to grazing further north 2007–2010, to lack of pasture
due to the 2009 drought, and to the grazing opportunities that
Laikipia presented (Evans, 2014). Some of these households had
bought small plots of land from the local administration over this
time, in order to legitimise their presence.
Pastoralist immigration into Laikipia is a process that has long
been resisted by Kikuyu smallholder farmers. Thus, during ﬁeld-
work in 2012, smallholders along the length of the West Laikipia
Fence complained about pastoralists either grazing on their farmed
land or competing for pasture on nearby unoccupied land. One
smallholder commented:
‘Every day you wake up and another manyatta has popped up
in front of your house... If one Samburu settles on a small plot,
the next day many of their friends and family will then come
there to graze their cows. A home of one family soon becomes
the home of 25 people with all of their cattle. Soon there is no
grass left for anyoneelse’s livestock.’ (Interviewno. 6,November
2012)
Furthermore, pastoralists with origins outside of Laikipia were
blamed for violent armed insecurity in the area:
‘These people have guns and come here and steal our livestock’
(Interview no. 60, November 2012).
The dominant idea of land rights recognised by smallholders on
Laikipia (and favoured by the Government of Kenya) centered on
individualised freeholdownership. This systemcontrastedwith the
traditional communal approach to land of pastoralists. Moreover,
land rights were seen to underpin political representation. Sub-
location chiefs in western Laikipia (all smallholders) recognised
their communities through tenure. As one chief said:
‘We don’t involve the pastoralist people if they are not residents
from this area.’ (Interview no. 12, October 2012)
Land purchase changed the political status of pastoralists:
if a Samburu or Maasai household bought land ‘then they would
be part of this community’ (Interview no. 12, October 2012).
Some conservancies in Laikipia had a similar approach to man-
aging their relationships with their pastoralist neighbours. One
conservancy manager described how they only invested in com-
munities holding land through title deeds:
‘A lot of these people live on land that doesn’t belong to them,
so by dealing with them you are actually condoning their illegal
use of land.’ (Interview no. 38, November 2012)
The issue of pastoralists using and settling on unoccupied sub-
divided former ranch landwas contentious. The LWFDirectornoted
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Table 1
Proﬁle of ranches bordered by the West Laikipia Fence.
Ranch Size (acres) Length of fence (km) Ownership History
I 63,530 31.7 Government Bought by government parastatal in 1975 from British
settler (former-soldier in WW1)
II 7841 11.5 Private Inherited through two generations from British settlers
ﬁrst owning ranch in 1940
III 5797 15.2 Private Inherited through one generation from Kikuyu
business man who bought the Ranch in 1980
IV 37,682 17.2 Private Bought by French family in 1980 from British settler
(former-soldier in WW1)
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hat, in Laikipia, in the context of Kikuyu smallholders and Samburu
astoralists,
‘Wehadone ethnic groupowning all the land and another group
occupying the land.’ (Interview no. 22, September 2012)
In the lead up to the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya
in which over one thousand people were killed), he noted that
‘we had a country already split along ethnic lines politically, so
peopledon’twant to gonear thosepolitics andpeople are scared
to go near it’ (Evans, 2014).
Responses to inter-ethnic conﬂict therefore were ‘all smoke and
irrors. We are professionally inadequate to deal with these situ-
tions where there are some very serious implications. I mean life
r death – people get killed.’ (Evans, 2014). Local chiefs feared to
ngage in the issue because of its ethnic implications. A ‘political
aralysis’ (Evans, 2014) ensued over the issue. So the prospect of a
ence that served the dual function of both protecting territory for
mallholders against crop-raids and controlling the movement of
astoralists by restricting their mobility, was an attractive one to
mallholders, their local leaders and to the MP representing them.
Fig. 3. Proposed alignment of the West Laikipia Fevate Inherited through one generation of white Kenyan
family who bought ranch off British settler
(former-soldier in WW1) in 1970
But this repressive and overtly political function of the fence could
never be publically referred to post 2007: public discussion of eth-
nicity was political taboo.
5.2. Alignment
The process of drawing the line of theWest Laikipia Fence began
in2006asa complexnegotiationbetween theLWFand themangers
or owners of ﬁve ranches (numbered I–V from South to North,
Table 1). These ranches varied in size, form of ownership, form of
enterprise and attitude towards wildlife (Table 1). Initially the LWF
proposed an alignment that would fence three ranches (I, IV and V
Fig. 3). When the MP and the LWF presented the fence concept to
these three ranch owners in early 2006, they were unequivocally
supportive and keen to be involved. Two ranches between them (II
and III) were initially on the cultivation side of the fence, since the
fence would connect the western boundaries of Ranch I to Ranch
IV, because both ranches were not engaged with wildlife conserva-
tion or the LWF, and both were ‘intolerant’ of elephants. However,
the owner of Ranch II turned up unexpectedly in the LWF ofﬁces in
Nanyuki in April 2006 and persuaded the LWF to include his prop-
nce and location in the Laikipia-wide fence.
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rty on the elephant side of the fence, stating his desire to turn
he ranch into a conservancy. Ranch III soon followed suit, and also
ecided to be included on the elephant side of the fence.
Each rancher’s motivation for being included in the West
aikipia Fencecenteredprimarilyon theirdesire to control access to
heir land rather than any desire to mitigate elephant crop-raiding.
hus, the owner of Ranch V said that the fence would help to phys-
cally demarcate their boundary to their neighbours:
‘The fence showed our neighbours where we began and where
their land ﬁnished...we wanted it to stop people who had
recently moved into the area from walking onto the ranch and
claiming they didn’t know the land belonged to us.’ (Interview
no. 36, November 2012)
All ﬁve ranchers wanted the fence to demarcate their boundary,
o exclude trespassers – particularly pastoralists grazing illegally
to increase the security and the productivity of their ranch, and
ecure grass stocks for their own cattle. With Laikipia’s variable
ainfall, grass was a precious resource. On Ranch I for example, the
anager said that they:
‘Wanted the fence to improve grazing pastures because there
was a lot of illegal grazing. We were being raided all over the
ranch, because people on all sides were assessing the pasture
from outside and coming in to steal grass.’ (Interview no. 30,
September 2012)
Owners of large-scale land-holdings in Laikipia faced two
hreats to their tenure, relating to the economic future of large-
cale ranching, and the legitimacy of land rights. The search for
ustice by African Kenyans over access to land, had driven a politi-
almovement inKenya todistribute landmoreequitably. Indeedby
010, Kenya’s new constitution (GoK, 2010) had addressed issues
f land reform and laid out new ‘democratic’ land–policies: one of
hich included a (as of yet indeterminate) maximum and mini-
um acreage of land under private ownership. Ranchers along the
est Laikipia Fence were concerned about the implications that
his policy could have for their tenure. At an emergency meeting
f ranchers in Laikipia West (on Ranch V, December 2012), the MP
or Laikipia West assured ranchers that to secure their properties
hey needed to be seen to be economically and socially produc-
ive for Kenya, (through tax, beef for the domestic market, and
mployment). However, since the 1990s commercial cattle ranch-
ng had faced reduced proﬁtability following the privatisation (and
ollapse) of the Kenya Meat Commission, increased international
tandards (which prevented Kenya from being able to export its
eef to European markets), and increased input costs.
The second threat to ranch tenure was the result of pastoral-
sts’ ancestral claims to land. In 2004 a series of ‘walk-ons’ (mass
respasses)onto ranches inLaikipiamarked thehundredthanniver-
ary of the ﬁrst Anglo–Maasai Treaty, between the British Colonial
overnment and Maasai elders (described above, Hughes, 2006).
. Maasai activists marked the anniversary with calls – directed at
oth the Kenyan and British governments – for compensation and
he return of Laikipia to them, on the basis that a 99-year lease
ad expired (and confusing the 1904 and 1911 Treaties, the lat-
er of which ushered in white occupation). Maasai activists rallied
undreds of Maasai people, from Laikipia and Narok County, to
nvade private ranches in Laikipia. In some walk-ons, property was
urned down, and stock was stolen. Police shot and killed a Maasai
lder (Hughes, 2007).
The walk-ons had created a ‘Zimbabwe-fear’ amongst ranchers.
any Samburu pastoralist interviewees claimed to share Laikipiak
aasai ancestry, as one man said:
‘The Laikipiak people lived here and grazed their cattle in
Laikipia before the whites came. They were the ancestors of usPolicy 51 (2016) 215–228 223
Samburu and Maasai. We need Laikipia to be returned to us—all
of it. We need to be given it freely because it is ours.’ (Interview
no. 45, November 2012)
In the context of these threats, the West Laikipia Fence helped
ranchers to legitimise their tenure, and to reinforce and communi-
cate the boundaries of their properties. In the process, they could
show themselves as interested in protecting the livelihoods of their
smallholder neighbours by helping prevent elephant crop-raids.
An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was the ﬁnal stage
in the process of drawing the line of the West Laikipia Fence. A
private company completed the EIA in January 2007, proposing the
same alignment as that put forward by the LWF, on the basis that
it followed existing ranch boundaries and therefore would be easy
to maintain. Unlike LWF’s proposal, the EIA recognised that both
agriculture and pastoralism co-existed along the proposed fence
and described the presence of ‘Samburu squatters’ there (Thiane,
2007: 22). It was noted that ‘unless arrangements are put in place
to provide access routes for livestock in some areas, this fence could
affect these pastoralists negatively’ (Thiane, 2007: 35). The security
beneﬁts of the fence to ranchers and smallholders through reduced
illegal grazing and stock theft were seen to outweigh the costs to
pastoralist squatters. In this way, the EIA effectively prioritised the
interests of landed stakeholders over those of pastoralists.
The ﬁnal proposed alignment of the West Laikipia Fence traced
the hard boundary separating the ﬁve ranches from land used for
smallholder cultivation and for subsistence livestock production
and stretched up across a sub-divided former settler ranch (where
the majority of plots had not been allocated or settled) to join the
fenced boundary of Ranch VI (Fig. 3). To follow Newman (2006:
148), the demarcation of boundaries comprises a process ‘through
which borders are constructed and the categories of difference or
separation created’, rather than simply ‘the drawing of a line on
a map or the construction of a fence in the physical landscape’.
Newman’s observation that the alignment of borders is typically
determined by political and social élites, also holds true for the
West Laikipia Fence. The interests of two stakeholder groups with
power and purchase over land came together in drawing the line
of the West Laikipia Fence. In creating the case for a fence, the con-
cerns of the numerous smallholders were identiﬁed, voiced, and
supported by the MP. In selecting the line of the fence, the inter-
ests of the small number of large-scale land owners was decisive,
as they owned the land on which the fence was to be built. Driven
by divergent motivations, these actors were able to order not only
relationships between elephants and farmers but also relationships
within society: among pastoralists, smallholders and ranchers.
Interestingly, although the rhetoric used by the LWF and the MP
describing the West Laikipia Fence focused on its technical, devel-
opmental and environmental impacts, the Kenyanmedia picked up
on the polarised politics that underpinned it. An article published
in the weekly newspaper The East African, was entitled ‘The haves
and have nots’ (Mbaria, 2006). In it, Mbaria described how plans to
complete the ﬁnal trans-Laikipia fence were ‘being seen as a ploy
to separate white ranchers from peasants’ and how the fence will
end up ‘splitting the country into two unequal parts’ as it makes
way for a ‘huge conservation site’ (Mbaria, 2006: 6).
6. Constructing the fence
The West Laikipia Fence Committee agreed in July 2007 on a
uniform design for the entire West Laikipia Fence, using standard
solar-powered technology. Individual ranchers could then modify
the fence as they wished. Seventy kilometers of fence were built
during ‘phase one’ of construction by an independent contractor
along the western boundaries of ranches I, II; the northern bound-
ary of Ranch III; and 12km of Ranch IV’s western boundary, and all
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ere completed by 2008. The remaining forty kilometers of fence
f ‘phase two’ were built along Ranch IV’s northern boundary and
anch V’s western boundary by the ranches themselves, to reduce
osts (Fig. 3). The northern-most stretch of fence, extending from
anchV to joinRanchVI’s boundary fence,wasneverbuilt, since the
noccupied land there was effectively an open access grazing area.
n 2008, Samburu and Pokot pastoralists engaged in a two-year,
loody conﬂict over access to grazing. The LWF Director decided
hat this length of fence was unfeasible because of insecurity from
he violence and because the social and ﬁnancial capital did not
xist there to maintain the fence.
Construction of phases one and two progressed slowly. When
he owner of Ranch IV returned to Europe with illness, the ranch
anager was left unable to authorise and commit the labour
equired to build his length of fence, and reported equipment going
issing from the ranch store. Completion of Ranch V’s length of the
ence that adjoined Ranch IV’s fence was stalled until Ranch IV’s
ence was completed. Construction of phase two was completed
y the end of 2011.
The ﬁnal alignment chosen for the fence left two pockets of
mallholder cultivation on the wrong side, Matigari and Mathira
Fig. 4). Once phase one had been completed, these areas began to
xperience intense crop-raiding from elephants. The LWF there-
ore agreed to train and resource the community of smallholders at
atigari to build their own2km longelectriﬁed ring-fence to encir-
le the area of cultivation. The community worked efﬁciently and
ohesively and the ring-fence was completed by June 2009. Hav-
ng heard about the Matigari ring-fence, Mathira residents voiced
imilar grievances to LWF and the KWS, saying that Mathira had
ecome ‘a highway for elephants’ (Interview no. 4, January 2012).
WF decided that the community would also be resourced by LWF
ith equipment, training and a technician to build an 8km ring-
ence around Mathira, which was completed in early 2011.e West Laikipia Fence.
The ﬁnal West Laikipia Fence was therefore 121km long and
ran just within the ranch boundaries of ﬁve different large-scale
ranches and around two areas of irrigated smallholder cultivation
(Fig. 4). It had four live wires and one earth wire held up by seven-
foot posts spaced 10 metres apart. Energiser houses containing the
solar panels each powered approximately 5km length of fence. The
fence was built to achieve a voltage of 7 kV.
7. Maintaining the fence
The effectiveness of electriﬁed elephant fences depends on their
delivering a short high-voltage, low current, electric shock when
touched and the circuit between the wires, the earth and the body
touching the fence is completed. Power is generated by solar pan-
els, and stored in lead acid accumulators. Fences are easily broken
if the posts are weak, the wires poorly attached to the post, or if
voltage falls. The most frequent cause for low voltage is shorting
from vegetation, for example long grass, or from badly connected
wires because of poor repair. Fences therefore need to bewell built,
and well-maintained, with regular clearance of growing vegetation
and timely and efﬁcient repair.
Elephants began to break the West Laikipia Fence even while
it was being constructed. Voltage began to vary along the fence as
investment in and capacity for maintenance varied between prop-
erties (Evans, 2014). The MP lost his campaign and failed to be
re-elected. Furthermore, the complex political reality of the social
landscape in which the West Laikipia Fence was situated became
clear as the fence was constructed. Once built, the West Laikipia
Fence line began to be pushed and pulled by the political interests
of different stakeholders. Previously silent stakeholders began to
forge a stake in it. The ﬁnal form of the fence was therefore the
result of ﬁne scale negotiations.
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The process of building the fence accentuated and concentrated
onﬂicts between stakeholders. During the construction of the
ence, pastoralists – who had been silent during the planning of
he fence – became noticeable as stakeholders. As discussed above,
heir interests in relation to access to land and resources stood in
tark contrast with those of other land users. Their presence led
o adaptations of the original fence layout in various ways. Three
xamples show how the resulting interactions shaped the physical
tate of the fence.
The ﬁrst example comprises ranchers who began to adapt the
ence to suit their own interests in relation to land. A year after
anch II’s length of fence had been built, and despite the owner’s
nitial conservation-centric sentiment, he drove all elephants from
is property and enclosed the whole ranch with an electriﬁed
ence. He added two more energisers to give an average voltage
f 11Kv. He added outriggers in places where elephants had pre-
iously broken into the ranch. Elephants, he explained, damaged
anch infrastructure:
‘I had to change all the tanks, all the pipes, you couldn’t walk
anywhere when elephants were here. I remember one elephant
following me for 5km. Without elephants we can get on with
business.’ (Interview no. 32, November 2012)
It is no accident that this strategy was also effective against
ncursions by pastoralists, who at various points began to under-
ine the West Laikipia Fence: by crossing beneath or through its
ires or by breaking it. The owner of Ranch II adapted his fence
anagement to be as impenetrable as possible to trespassers: ‘no
ence is people proof, it’s how you manage it that makes it people
roof’ (Evans, 2014). He slept with a radio by his ear. If there were
eports of people crossing the fence he would go in his Land Cruiser
nddrive off offenders, impounding pastoralist cattle and imposing
hefty ﬁne. As he told me, ‘I work ﬂat out to make this place work.
his grass is for my cows and no one else’ (Evans, 2014). For the
ame purpose, Ranch III added vertical strands to the main fence,
onnecting the live wires, so that pastoralists could not enter the
roperty.
The second example is along a section of the West Laikipia
ence that borders the Pesi swamp next to Ranch I (Fig. 4). Many
mallholders had bought land next to the Pesi swamp, southwest
f the proposed alignment of the Ranch I’s length of the West
aikipia Fence and were cultivating there by pumping water from
he swamp. These smallholders wanted the fence to be north-
ast of the swamp to allow them access to water to irrigate their
rops. However the Kenya Wildlife Service, having surveyed the
lanned fence line, argued that the fence must be southwest of
he swamp, and outside Ranch I, to ensure that elephants had
ccess to water in the swamp, otherwise they would break the
ence to reach the swamp. Ranch I supported the Kenya Wildlife
ervice’s argument saying that they wanted to develop a conser-
ancy on the land and therefore wanted to maximise elephant
abitat. The real motivation of Ranch I’s management, however,
as to prevent pastoralists crossing into the ranch to access
ater in the swamp and grass in the ranch. The ranch manager
aid:
‘The water belongs to the ranch. It is for our cows and the ele-
phants. We don’t want people taking their cows to the water
then walking onto the ranch and stealing all the grass. The fence
keeps them on their side.’ (Interview no. 30, November 2012)
As fence construction began along the Pesi swamp, pastoralists
egan to cross, break and undermine the fence. As one pastoralist
eighbour at Pesi told us:
‘No one asked us about where we thought the fence should go.
[Ranch I] built that fence to deny our cows access to water. SoPolicy 51 (2016) 215–228 225
we will just pass through it and take our cows there to drink
when we want.’ (Interview no. 42, September 2012)
Another said:
‘I’mnot going to letmy cows starve,when I look across the fence
and see all of that grass.’ (Interview no. 51, December 2012).
The LWF mediated the conﬂicting interests and compromised
with a design that zig-zagged across the swamp so that pastoral-
ists, smallholders and elephants could all access water. However
the LWF fencing strategy had speciﬁcally warned that there were
‘serious technical difﬁculties’ in a conﬁguration that crossed water
because of the difﬁculty of accessing the wires if they needed
repairing (Thouless et al., 2002: 4). Indeed, the fence at Pesi never
functioned effectively as a barrier. It consistently had low voltage
and its wires lay dangling in the water. The LWF Director described
the demarcation of the West Laikipia Fence:
‘It went through all sorts of bizarre incarnations. It was a bloody
disaster. Different interests were pulling it everywhere, along
with a lack of experience. We were trying to maximise space
for elephants as good greenies and of course the solution would
have been. . .to avoid Pesi swamp completely.’ (Interview no.
22, September 2012)
The third example is amongst stakeholders in the Mathira ring-
fence. The people living within the Mathira ring-fence were all
smallholder farmers. They wanted a ring-fence to follow the same
design as the rest of the West Laikipia Fence. However they were
surrounded by pastoralists, who had moved into the area to set-
tle. LWF worked with smallholders to construct a ﬁve-strand fence
with ﬁve live wires evenly spaced from ground to seven foot high:
consistent with the rest of the West Laikipia Fence. However this
design also prevented the movement of other animals, including
livestock. Pastoralists resident in the area protested, demanding
a design with three raised strands that left space to allow their
cattle access to water in the Mathira swamp (Fig. 4) and pasture
within the fence, while still deterring elephants. Smallholder resi-
dentswithin theproposed fencedisputed thisdesign. They said that
only a ﬁve-strand fence would deter elephants. However elephants
were not their only concern. Smallholderswere also seeking a fence
thatwould exclude pastoralists and reinforce their territory. As one
(smallholder) village leader at Mathira told us:
‘It just isn’t true that Mathira farmers only wanted the fence
to keep elephants away from their farms. They also wanted
to keep pastoralists out of their land. . .pastoralists come onto
their farms with their cattle at night, their cows eat their crops.’
(Interview no. 52, January 2012)
Pastoralists threatened to sabotage a ﬁve-strand fence if it was
built. LWF attempted to mediate these different interests and
compromised by selecting the three raised-strand design, through
which livestock could pass.
These examples show the complex interactions among small-
holders, ranchers and pastoralists over the fence. These centred on
its alignment, and it management (with some stakeholders delib-
erately undermining its effectiveness, or breaking it). For ranchers,
the fence helped consolidate their moral and legal claim to their
land. For smallholders the fence had symbolic and material signiﬁ-
cance in terms of land rights, controlling access towater, and access
to their land by pastoralists. For pastoralists the West Laikipia
Fence symbolically embodied ideas about their historical loss of
land rights, and directly affected their everyday de facto access to
land and water. Pastoralists began to assert their views through the
threat of subversive action even during the process of construction,
and continued such action after completion,with signiﬁcant effects
on the fence’s effectiveness: breaking the fence and creating gaps
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hrough which elephants passed. Both pastoralists and elephants
esisted the spatial ordering that was being imposed on them by
he fence, and its smallholder and rancher supporters, seeking to
ecure their territory through physically breaking through fences.
heir ability to do so was dependent on the actions of ranchers
nd this varied between properties: some ranchers fortiﬁed and
nforced their fences, whilst others failed to repair broken fences
nd wires sagged and lost voltage. The divergent politics of differ-
nt actors were therefore materially relevant to the fence’s central
urpose: in determining its effectiveness as a barrier to elephant
ovement (Evans, 2014).
. Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that while the construction of an
elephant fence’ built to reduce HEC was presented as a technical
olution to HEC, it was in fact an inherently political process. In
heory, the West Laikipia Fence provided a spatial solution to the
onﬂict that results when people and elephants share space. How-
ver, the territory it created on the ground was captured by the
ifferent political interests of various stakeholders. By attempting
o create separate spaces for elephants (on ranches) and for small-
older cultivation, the fence seemed to offer a simple, high-proﬁle
olution to the complex problem of HEC that appealed to much of
he LWF’s diverse membership, to the Kenya Wildlife Service with
ts stretched resources for mitigating HEC, and to the Dutch Gov-
rnment in termsof their development and conservationobjectives
or bilateral aid in Kenya.
The fence, however, had other effects. It was not just a techni-
al intervention, but also a highly political one (c.f. Ferguson 1990).
hrough its physical structure and technical function, its different
olitical and socialmeanings and impactswere hidden. It bolstered
he political campaign of an aspiring MP by securing territory for
is smallholder constituents. It helped smallholders to secure their
and from intrusion from not only crop-raiding elephants, but also
rom pastoralists competing for grazing. It enabled ranchers to
hysically demarcate their properties and to exclude trespassers,
nd in one case, elephants. The fence allowed ranchers to show
hemselves to be helping their neighbours, whilst simultaneously
egitimising their boundaries and maintaining their separate ter-
itories. The conﬂicting political motivations of stakeholders were
anifested once the fence turned into a physical reality. Previously
ilent stakeholders began to assert their stake in the fence. Pas-
oralists contested the alignment, design and construction of the
ence, demanding that it accommodated their needs and not just
hose of smallholders. Meanwhile ranch owners continued to rein-
orce their interest in relation to land by building stronger, more
mpenetrable fences.
We conclude that the resulting physical form of an ‘elephant
ence’ reﬂected the power dynamics and politics of different stake-
olders. The power dynamics between stakeholders involved in
he boundary making of the West Laikipia Fence resonate with
aikipia’s history of exclusion and inclusion. There were two waves
f inclusion in Laikipia: the colonial government setting aside
aikipia as ‘the White Highlands’ and the purchase and settlement
f sub-divided former ranches by Kikuyu smallholders. This arti-
le has shown that through the demarcation of the West Laikipia
ence, large-scale landowners and Kikuyu politicians continue to
old power in the landscape and are able deﬁne how it is spa-
ially ordered. Maasai pastoralist early occupants of Laikipia were
hysically and forcibly excluded from Laikipia by the colonial gov-
rnment, having moved into Laikipia after being promised it as a
aasai Reserve. The fence physically excluded pastoralists’ access
o land. A fence, therefore, cannot be separated from the politi-
al landscape in which it is embedded and which it deﬁnes, ande Policy 51 (2016) 215–228
whose divisions it exacerbates. Furthermore the politics between
human actors were not just signiﬁcant in themselves but were also
important in the extent to which the fence functions as a barrier to
elephants.
Fences are increasingly being built throughout elephant range,
inAsia andAfrica, to order the relationshipbetweenpeople andele-
phants. This seemingly simple technical solution to a conservation
problem can reinforce and restructure the social and political land-
scape inwhich it exists.We recommend that the social andpolitical
contexts of electriﬁed fences built to mitigate HEC are assessed
and considered in the planning and construction as thoroughly as
the ecological context in which they are situated and which they
control.
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